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Abstract
In its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme
Court restricted the right to sue for private damages suﬀered from violations of
section 4 of the Clayton Act to direct purchasers. Despite the fact that typically
antitrust injury is, at least in part, passed on to ﬁrms lower in the production
chain and ultimately to consumers, Illinois Brick has since stood as a binding
legal constraint. This paper considers the strategic use that upstream ﬁrms
can make of Illinois Brick to shield themselves from private damages claims.
In a repeated game setting, we ﬁnd that Illinois Brick may facilitate upstream
ﬁrms in engaging horizontally in an overt collusive arrangement, with concealed
side-payments to their direct purchasers that discourage them from ﬁling suit.
An example is given of such an ‘Illinois Wall’, in which downstream ﬁrms are
given part of the upstream cartel proﬁts through a symmetric rationing of
their inputs at low prices. The Illinois Wall is found to be resilient to entry,
imperfections of the legal system and leniency programs. In fact, the wall is
particularly stable when competition is relatively strong at both the up- and
the downstream level.
JEL-codes: D4, L1,L 4 .
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Under section 4 of the Clayton Act, individuals or ﬁrms injured in their business
or property by companies in breach of the competition law can bring private treble-
damages suits to be made whole. Since the production of goods or services often
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1involves a number of intermediate ﬁrms, any upstream anti-competitive behavior,
such as price-ﬁxing, is likely to spill-over into several markets, causing larger and
smaller monetary injury in the production chain, before ultimately falling in part on
the consumers. The precise breaking-down of such vertically spread antitrust dam-
ages is complicated, involving applied general equilibrium analysis and sophisticated
econometrics.
Twin Supreme Court rulings, the ﬁrst in 1968 in Hanover Shoe Co. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp.,t h es e c o n di n1977 in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,h a v e
signiﬁcantly reduced the potential complexity of private punative damages claims,
however.1 In the Hanover Shoe ruling–in which the defendant, United Shoe Ma-
chinery Co., which was earlier found to have monopolized the machinery market
through long-term leasing contracts, claimed that the plaintiﬀ, Hanover Shoe Co., a
direct purchaser, was not injured by these anti-competitive contracts, because it had
been able to pass the claimed overcharge on to its customers–the Supreme Court
disallowed the defensive use of pass-on on the argument that failing to prevent it
would unduly lengthen and complicate antitrust cases and disperse private incentives
to seek antitrust injury recovery. As a result, irrespective of the question to what ex-
tent the direct purchaser indeed incurred any damages, by Hanover Shoe it is entitled
to ask the defendant’s overcharge, trebled.
Almost a decade later, in the 1977 Illinois Brick decision–in which the State of
Illinois claimed in conjunction with several hundred local governmental institutions to
have been harmed by a ﬁxing of concrete block prices by the defendant, Illinois Brick
Co., which artiﬁcially increased the costs of the contractors via which the plaintiﬀs
carried out their construction contracts in a complex vertical chain–the Court set
a companion standard by also rejecting any oﬀensive use of the pass-on argument.
The plaintiﬀ was denied compensation and the precedent was set that only direct
purchasers of ﬁrms that have acted anti-competitively can sue for damages.
The prime legal argument for denying indirect purchasers standing to sue in Illi-
nois Brick relates to a multiple liability problem created by Hanover Shoe.S i n c et h e
direct purchaser is entitled to the full overcharge by the latter standard, allowing in-
direct purchasers to sue for further money as well would eﬀectively multiply the total
liability of the defendant far over the three times total damages that are speciﬁed in
the Clayton Act as the appropriate remedy. Illinois Brick thus repairs the liability
problem Hanover Shoe created–albeit at the expense of potentially permitting the
w r o n gp e o p l et os e e kd a m a g e s .
Several scholars have further defended the Hanover Shoe-Illinois Brick pair of
rulings on economic grounds. In the seminal Landes and Posner (1979), the view
is taken that the intent of Congress to allow for private damages claims in passing
the Clayton Act was ﬁrst and foremost to provide for an extra trust-deterrence by
creating a private channel of policing, alongside public enforcement. Therefore, ef-
ﬁciency, rather than fairness of compensation, is the appropriate criterion to judge
1 Cf. 392 U.S. 481 (1968) and 431 U.S. 720 (1977), respectively.
2Illinois Brick by. Since direct purchasers typically have superior information on the
eﬀects of any anti-competitive acts of their suppliers, putting all monetary incentives
with them is likely to reduce transaction costs compared to a situation with many
fragmented indirect cases. Also, any costs involved in coordinating class action suits
of various ﬁrms and individuals damaged indirectly–and therefore each possibly only
a little–are reduced with the incentive to ﬁle a private damages claim placed in a
single hand. Moreover, the determination of all pass-ons of artiﬁcial cost increases
would require courts to perform multiple, long and complicated analyses involving
a large number of interested parties, which would be prohibitively costly. All these
eﬃciency arguments have been disputed–in fact, in Illinois Brick three Supreme
Court judges originally dissented–and in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate, bills were proposed–but never enacted–to overrule the two Supreme Court
rulings.2 Nevertheless, Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick stand today as binding legal
constraints.3
Despite its potential to reduce the costs of legal procedures and increase private
incentives to bring anti-competitive practices to light, however, there is a detrimental
eﬀect Illinois Brick may have, that should be noted as well. By eﬀectively shielding
antitrust violators from all private parties but those directly involved, namely, Illinois
Brick may potentially give upstream ﬁrms a safe-haven to engage quite overtly in
collusive arrangements, as long as they can discourage their direct purchasers–and
them only–from ﬁling suit. Thus allowing potential violators of competition law to
focus discouragement eﬀorts on the sole party with standing to sue may neutralize
part of the enhanced private incentive eﬀect Illinois Brick is generally thought to
have.
Suggestions to this eﬀect have been made in passing in the literature, yet seem
never to have inspired a thorough analysis. Harris and Sullivan (1979), for example,
in closing of a lengthy exposition on determining pass-ons, only brieﬂyn o t et h a t :
“There are situations in which granting the cause of action solely to direct
purchasers eﬀectively forecloses any private suits. Often, direct purchasers
pass on all or substantially all of the overcharge. (...) If the ongoing
relationship between the direct purchaser and the potential defendant
has any value to the direct purchaser (and it often will have), the direct
purchaser will to that extent be deterred from suing.” (op.cit., pp. 351-2)
2 Cf. bills S. 1874 by Senator Edward Kennedy and others, and H.R. 8359 by Representative
Peter Rodino and others (later modiﬁed as H.R. 11942), respectively. For some early debate on
the multiple liability problem under Hanover Shoe without Illinois Brick, see LaRue and Newton
(1978) and Sneeden (1979). In Harris and Sullivan (1979)–on which we draw below–the force of
the complexity argument of passing-on calculations is questioned.
3 Recently, for example, Microsoft escaped private damages by appealing successfully to Illinois
Brick in Davidson v. Microsoft Corp. Md. Ct. Spec. App., No. 60, 2/28/02–cf. “Indirect Pur-
chasers Barred From Bringing Claim Against Microsoft Under State Statute,” Electronic Commerce
&L a wR e p o r t ,V o l u m e7 ,N u m b e r11 of Wednesday, March 13, 2002.
3After that, they do conclude, however, that judicial experience shows that direct
purchasers nevertheless do bring cases.4
Interestingly enough, however, several empirical analyses into the eﬀects of the
two Supreme Court rulings on the number of private antitrust cases quite consistently
ﬁnd an increase in total cases after Hanover Shoe in 1968, yet a decrease after Illi-
nois Brick in 1977. Directly following the Illinois Brick ruling, Landes and Posner
(1979) reports a structural reduction from 1977 to 1978 in the total number of pri-
vate cases brought in several districts–from Southern California to Northern Illinois.
The authors hesitated to attribute these eﬀects to Illinois Brick, however. Instead,
they conjectured that the fall in cases reﬂected an overall downward trend in public
enforcement from 1977 to 1978, on the argument that private claims often follow up
on public adverse ﬁndings.5 But again later studies, involving more post-ruling data,
in Snyder (1986) and Joyce and McGuckin (1986), found decreases in the number
of private cases after Illinois Brick as well, suggesting a permanent negative eﬀect.
Still, however–here under reference to the fact that the decrease in the number of
private cases found was judged to be only small and statistically insigniﬁcant–the
authors were not willing to conclude that the eﬀects could be due to the Supreme
Court constraints to private litigation. Instead, the net eﬀect of Illinois Brick was
judged to be “neutral”.6 Yet, if indeed the total eﬀect with both rulings in place has
only been modestly negative, then still the data lend themselves to the interpretation
that Illinois Brick more than reversed the signiﬁcant increase in private cases seen
after Hanover Shoe–and before Illinois Brick.7
One reason perhaps for why the idea that Illinois Brick can stabilize non-compe-
titive relationships was so easily discarded, despite some empirical indication for it,
may have been that the long-run relationships that direct purchasers were supposed
not to be willing to put in jeopardy by ﬁling suit were understood with no active
involvement of the suppliers. Harris and Sullivan (1979) refer to them as issues of
“continuity and goodwill.” Likewise, Snyder (1986) acknowledges the eﬀect–which
he understands as direct purchasers fearing “retaliation” by the suppliers on which
they depend–yet down-plays it in a footnote by saying that although such
“..retaliation ... cannot be dismissed, its practical signiﬁcance is open to
question.” (op.cit., p.470).
Certainly, there are market imperfections, such as lock-in situations, in which
switching from one supplier to another involves some costs for the purchaser. The
4 Similar concern was forwarded by the proponents of bills S. 1874 and H.R. 8359. Cf. Sneeden
(1979), p.219.
5 Op.cit., pp.632-4.
6 Snyder (1986), p.482; Joyce and McGuckin (1986), p.239.
7 Applying various estimation methods to 1963-1982 data, Snyder (1986) found a positive co-
eﬃcient relating the number of private cases ﬁled to Hanover Shoe, yet a larger negative coeﬃcient
relating them to Illinois Brick. Cf. op.cit.,p . 4 7 9 ,t a b l e4 .
4relationship with a software company responsible for a company’s main management
information systems, for example, or that with the external accounting oﬃce is likely
to be of this nature. Filing against such vital suppliers would most deﬁnitely put
stress on the service relationship, probably leading to a discontinuation–rather cases
of embroilment than retaliation, but nevertheless. However, it is quite questionable
indeed, as Snyder (1986) says, that the costs involved in overcoming these relatively
minor exogenous hurdles are suﬃc i e n t l yh i g ht oe x p e c tt h e mt ok e e pd i r e c tp u r c h a s e r s
from exercising their right to obtain treble overcharges–typically a lot of money.
A much more serious type of money foregone when downstream ﬁrms ﬁle com-
plaint, however, is beneﬁts forwarded by the suppliers to the direct purchasers in an
attempt to keep the latter from exercising their right to recover private damages.
That is, side-payments from the upstream industry behaving anti-competitively to
the downstream purchasers, in exchange for not ﬁling suit. It is in this context also
that one can truly speak of ‘retaliation’, in the sense that the side-payments are with-
drawn upon private claims, since these would lead to the breakdown of the upstream
collusive arrangement–the source of the money. This kind of long-term relationship
is all the more interesting, not only because it is likely to provide a substantially
larger incentive for the direct purchasers, but also because it is costly to the suppliers
to maintain. A question of some interest to ask, therefore, is whether such upstream-
downstream collusive agreements are tacitly sustainable, and what role Illinois Brick
can have in setting them up.
In this paper, we consider circumstances under which ﬁrms may use Illinois Brick
to put up an ‘Illinois Wall’ in order to shield themselves from private damages claims.
In a simple vertical chain, there is an upstream industry and a direct purchaser
downstream industry, the latter selling directly to the consumers. Both industries
are characterized by a variable number of ﬁrms in Cournot competition. Up- and
downstream ﬁrms have repeated interaction over an inﬁnite period of time, which
captures the long-term nature of their trade relationship. The upstream industry
seeks to collude and ﬁxp r i c e s . U s i n gIllinois Brick, it can concentrate its eﬀorts
to keep its customers from ﬁling a treble damages claim solely on the downstream
ﬁrms. With them it needs to work out an attractive compensation scheme, which is
tacit and leaves no obvious evidence of anti-competitive behavior on the part of the
downstream ﬁrms, for otherwise antitrust suits would be brought by the consumers–
the direct purchasers of the downstream ﬁrms–or the people. The two industries
manage to do so via a simple rationing scheme. By symmetrically selling to each of
the downstream ﬁrms only a limited amount of inputs, the cartel creates a scarcity
on the market for ﬁnal consumer products that is beneﬁcial to the downstream ﬁrms,
yet creates a consumer detriment. This tacit vertical understanding between the
industries escapes prosecution. And because of that, so does the horizontal cartel,
even if that cartel is overt and the whole arrangement is common knowledge.
The potential perverse eﬀect of Illinois Brick here reported on is just one aspect
of a much more extensive treatment of incentives eﬀects from private damages claims
5and their contribution to eﬃciency in Salop and White (1986), Baker (1988), Besanko
and Spulber (1990) and Briggs, Huryn and McBride (1996). The seminal Salop and
White (1986) is an extensive survey of the aspects and empirics of private antitrust
enforcement–in which Illinois Brick is only brieﬂy mentioned as a desirable “trim-
ming of the plaintiﬀs’ powers and strengthening the defendants’ powers” (op.cit.,
p.1039). Baker (1988) and Besanko and Spulber (1990) essentially extend on the po-
sition of Landes and Posner (1979) that private antitrust enforcement provides a more
direct, and therefore better informed channel, thus enhancing legal eﬃciency. Both
papers focus on asymmetric information, arguing that in the presence thereof, pri-
vate claims increase eﬃciency and should therefore be encouraged. In Briggs, Huryn
and McBride (1996) the interplay between public cases and private follow-on suits
is considered, pointing out a potential ineﬃciency of treble damages. As defendants
invite parties to bring follow-on treble damages cases by signalling a weak position
when they settle in the public case, ineﬃciently many full public cases are brought
in equilibrium. The possibility that Illinois Brick may deter private damages claims,
however, is not discussed in this literature.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, industry relations are
m o d e l l e di na ni n ﬁnitely repeated game setting, in which the competitive benchmark
situation is analyzed. Section 3 considers upstream collusion. It is established that
treble damages without compensation for the downstream industry will certainly lead
to private claims. Subsequently, in Section 4, some bricks for the Illinois Wall are
laid. The total of proﬁts that the up- and the downstream industry have between
them is shown to increase as a result of the upstream collusion, so that there is the
potential for covert side-payments. Total welfare, however, is seen to decrease in
the upstream price level, so that consumers, were they given the right to sue for
damages, would be likely to exercise it. In Section 5, a trigger strategy that forms
an Illinois Wall is set out and analyzed. It is shown that, when downstream ﬁrms
are suﬃciently patient, Illinois Walls can shield upstream collusion from downstream
claims. In Section 6, the Illinois Wall is shown to be quite resilient. It can withstand
entry up- and downstream, for example, as well as imperfections in the legal system
and leniency programs that reward the ﬁrst ﬁrm to notify the arrangement with
the authorities. Moreover, the more competitive both the up- and the downstream
sector are, the more stable an Illinois Wall may be erected. Section 7 provides some
concluding remarks, including a careful suggestion of a possible actual Illinois Wall.
2 Upstream-Downstream Competition
Consider a market in which m ≥ 2 identical upstream ﬁrms, indexed j =1 ,2,...,m,
produce a certain good, used as an input in the downstream industry, against nor-
malized constant marginal cost c =0and no ﬁxed costs. The sole purchasers of
this input are n ≥ 1 downstream ﬁrms, indexed i =1 ,2,...,n, which each buy the
input from the upstream ﬁrms at a price p per unit, use it in a linear relation in their
6production process to obtain their ﬁnal commodity, which they subsequently sell to
their consumers. By an appropriate choice of units in which to measure the volume
of input and output, the linear production technology can be modelled as one-to-
one production. There are no alternative ways of obtaining the input, nor can the
downstream ﬁrms substitute away from it. For simplicity, assume that downstream
production involves no costs but those of the single input.
Consumer demand for the ﬁnal commodity is given by the linear inverse demand
function
P (Qd)=1− Qd, (1)
where Qd =
Pn
i=1 qi,d is the sum of quantities produced by the downstream ﬁrms.
Suppose that the market exists indeﬁnitely, without technological progress chang-
ing its supply structure, nor demographic or other changes shifting demand. As a
result, the up- and downstream ﬁrms are engaged in a long-term relationship. In their
production planning, they all take an inﬁnite time horizon as basis, in which they
discount future proﬁts at a rate δ ∈ [0,1), so that the interplay between the ﬁrms can
be understood as Cournot competition in a repeated game framework. When both
industries act non-cooperatively, the one-shot Cournot equilibrium is played in each
period. Since the upstream ﬁrms control the inputs for the downstream industry, this
is a sequential game, of which the subgame perfect equilibrium is found by backward
induction, as follows.
Given the input price p,t h ed o w n s t r e a mﬁrms engage in quantity competition
and each downstream ﬁrm i faces the optimization problem
max
qi
(1 − Qd − p)qi,d.
As a result, downstream individual supply in the symmetric Cournot equilibrium is
qi,d (p)=
1−p




(1 − p). (2)
The upstream industry exploits this best reply behavior of the downstream ﬁrms, so
that upstream inverse demand is given by the inverse of total downstream sales as a







j=1 qj,u is the supply of the m upstream ﬁrms. This upstream demand
yields an individual upstream proﬁtf o rﬁrm j
π
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which it maximizes with respect to qj,u, given the choices of the other upstream ﬁrms.
7With both the upstream and the downstream industry thus in Cournot competi-
















m + n +1
(m +1 )( n +1 )
,
where the superscripts c refer to ‘competition’–to be set against anti-competitive



















in the up- and downstream industry, respectively.
Notice that when the number of upstream ﬁrms m becomes very large, the input
price p will approach marginal costs and individual proﬁts of the upstream ﬁrms will
go to zero. The same is true for the market price P and proﬁts for each downstream
ﬁrm when the number of downstream ﬁrms n goes to inﬁnity. The present setup–
albeit simple–thus captures all possible vertical combinations of market forms be-
tween the extremes of perfect competition and monopoly.
3 Upstream Collusion
The upstream industry now entertains the idea to conspire in collusion and ﬁxt h e
input prices charged to the downstream ﬁrms. Suppose it is able to do so, yet not
without leaving some traces. That is, the upstream ﬁrms consider to engage in overt
collusion.8 Let the downstream industry remain competitive. The upstream industry










which it will sell at a price pa = 1
2–the superscript a refers to the fact that the
upstream ﬁrms now engage in ‘anti-competitive behavior’.
The formation of such a cartel is obviously proﬁtable for the upstream industry,

















8 In the following, focus is on the stability of vertical collusive arrangements between the up-
and downstream industries. Horizontal cartel stability can be guaranteed under reference to the
traditional cartel stability arguments–cf. Carlton and Perloﬀ (2000), Chapter 5, or Motta (2004),
Chapter 4. The possibility to erect an Illinois Wall allows for the upstream cartel to collude with
explicit arrangements–arguably more easy than tacit collusion. The issue is dealt with more ex-
tensively in Section 6 below.
8where strict inequality follows from the fact that m ≥ 2. Hence, the upstream indus-
tries can work out a distribution of cartel proﬁts that will make the cartel attractive
t oe a c ha n de v e r ym e m b e r ,i nc o m p a r i s o nt oc o m p e t i t i o n .
The ﬁrms in the downstream industry, however, are likely to be hurt by the
upstream collusion, for they would–but for few exceptions, discussed below–see
their input prices increase. Unless they are able to pass the entire increase in input
prices on to the consumers–which, since consumer demand is elastic, would only be
the case when they price at marginal costs–they see their proﬁts decrease as a result
of the increased input prices. Suppose, however, that the downstream industry knows
of the upstream cartel and can obtain the available evidence to prove its existence
in court. Since the upstream cartel clearly is in breach of competition law, each
downstream ﬁrm, therefore, has the option to ask for reparation of the damages
suﬀered as a result of the upstream collusion. It can do so by bringing a private
antitrust injury claim. Moreover, under reference to Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick,
each downstream ﬁrm can, even if it was indeed able to pass the larger part, or all of
the upstream cartel’s anti-competitive price increase on to the consumers, seek treble
damages.
As is customary in antitrust damages cases, the damages suﬀered from anti-
competitive behavior of suppliers are calculated as the overcharge, computed as
the diﬀerence between the anti-competitively raised price of the downstream inputs
and the input price that would have prevailed without the anti-competitive acts–
sometimes referred to as the ‘but for’ price–multiplied by the quantity purchased
by the claimant under the anti-competitive regime.9 Denote the industry-wide total
overcharge suﬀered by the downstream ﬁrms as a function of the cartel input price














in the present setting. Since the Nash equilibria considered here are symmetric–
for all ﬁrms are identical and the model is linear–the overcharge suﬀered by each
individual downstream ﬁrm is 1
nDd (pa) > 0.
Likewise, the overcharge suﬀered by the consumers from the anticompetitive activ-
ities of the upstream cartel, denoted by Dc (P a),w h e r ePa is the downstream price
that results when the downstream industry buys its inputs at the anticompetitive
















9 Again, a precise determination of damages, or to whom they should accrue, is typically not
the prime objective of the Court. Argumentation using the elasticity of demand to show that the
overcharge underestimates the lost proﬁts downstream, for it ignores proﬁts that would have been
made on the greater volume, is usually not entered, or only mentioned in passing by the plaintiﬀst o
show their damage estimates are conservative–cf. Royall (1997). For a comprehensive treatment
of damage calculations, see O’Brien (1998).
9in the Cournot setting. Since we have a continuum of consumers, individual claims
have no substance. Therefore, in the following, consumer claims are considered to be
class action suits. Clearly, Dc (P a) > 0.
For clarity of exposition, suppose in the following that if a private antitrust suit
indeed is brought, there will be no diﬃculty in substantiating the claim, so that it
will lead with certainty to a granting of damages. This is in line with the assumption
that there is evidence available to prove the existence of the upstream cartel in court.
Furthermore, let the legal costs involved in bringing an individual claim be negligible.
One way of justifying the latter assumption is that the downstream ﬁrms share their
legal costs, as only one initial trial, brought by a single downstream ﬁrm or as a
class action suit, would be required for all downstream ﬁrms to claim their individual
damages at little incremental costs in follow-on suits. Henceforth, we will assume
therefore that when one individual downstream ﬁrm ﬁles suit, all others will follow and
the upstream industry will be ordained to pay damages based on the industry wide
overcharge. Consumer claims are also be handled collectively. Finally, we abstract
from the possibility that a public case is brought against the upstream cartel. Under
these assumptions, clearly the downstream industry will seek treble damages and ﬁle
a claim–irrespective of the extent of their actual injury.
Although these assumptions set the stage for establishing our result that Illinois
Brick may be instrumental in shielding the upstream cartel from private cases in
a setting in which private damages cases are most likely to be brought, a minor
generalizing of the trebling of the overcharge allows for tracing the eﬀects of such im-
perfections as legal transaction costs, leniency programs and uncertainty concerning
rulings of the court. To that end, let µ>0 be a parameter for the strength of the
damage claim. Obviously, µ =3corresponds to treble damages when the legal sys-
tem is perfect. Transaction costs associated with bringing a private damages claim,
coordination costs, or uncertainty about rulings would analytically take the form of a
lower value of µ. Likewise, additional stimuli to ﬁle suits, such as notiﬁcation bonuses
or lenient treatment would be reﬂe c t e di nh i g h e rv a l u e so fµ.10 On the net damages
multiple, we have the following benchmark result.
Proposition 1 When the downstream ﬁrms suﬀering antitrust damages have stand-
ing to sue, the upstream cartel will be deterred for all µ ≥ 1. When both the down-
stream ﬁrms and the consumers have standing to sue, the upstream cartel will be
deterred for all µ ≥ 2
3.
Proof. The Cournot proﬁts for the upstream industry under competition are
mπc
u. The upstream payoﬀ under collusion, which the industry knows will invite
damages claims with certainty are
mπ
a
u − µ[Dd (p
a)+αDc (P
a)],
10 We will return to the potential eﬀect on our results of these alternative assumptions in Section
6.
10where α is a parameter reﬂecting standing to sue: α =0when consumers do not have
the ability to bring a private damages claim, and α =1when they do. Note that we
can interpret values of α strictly between 0 and 1 as a situation where consumers are
entitled to sue, but where the probability that they will organize a class action suit or
gather suﬃcient information to substantiate a claim is equal to α (an interpretation
similar to that given to µ above).
Comparing Cournot proﬁts and collusion proﬁts net of treble damages, the latter





(1 + α)n +1
,
which is bounded from below by 1 when only downstream ﬁrms have standing to sue
(α =0 ), and the number of upstream ﬁrms increases from m =2to inﬁnity. It is
bounded from below by 2
3 when both downstream ﬁrms and consumers can bring a
case (α =1 )a n dm goes to inﬁnity and n =1 .11
4B r i c k s f o r t h e W a l l
Clearly, and in accordance with the mainstream opinion on Hanover Shoe and Illi-
nois Brick, in the present setting the private antitrust enforcement channel provided
by the possibility to claim damages alone installs suﬃcient incentive to discipline
the upstream industry into behaving competitively, even when the system works
imperfectly–i.e.,i fµ<3. That is, unless the upstream cartel can somehow ward oﬀ
these private suits. One way to do so would be to pay those with standing to sue a
suﬃciently high compensation for the loss they incur when they refrain from exercis-
ing their right to claim damages. Here is where the potential anti-competitive eﬀects
of Illinois Brick come into play. By giving only the direct purchasers standing to
sue for antitrust damages, Illinois Brick allows the upstream cartel to focus any such
bribing eﬀorts solely on the downstream industry. Even if the consumers know all
about the overt upstream cartel, that is, they simply could not bring a claim against
it, for they only deal indirectly with those in breach of competition law. Illinois Brick
may thus create a safe-haven for overt collusion.
It is not obvious that a compensation scheme between the up- and the downstream
industry, for the silence of the latter, exists, however, for it needs to satisfy several
conditions. The vertical arrangement would need to be covert, for example, so that the
combined up- and downstream conspiracy cannot be proven a breach of competition
law. Should it be straightforward for consumers to present evidence and build a strong
11 Note that the trebling of damages is surprisingly well chosen in the present setup: when
consumers do not have standing to sue, mπa
u − µDd (pa) ≤ 0 for µ ≥ m+1
m−1, which decreases from
three to one when m increases from two to inﬁnity. Hence, treble damages will always lead to a loss
for the upstream industry in case the downstream industry sues, and, moreover, for the special case
m =2 , treble damages make the cartel proﬁts vanish exactly.
11private damages case, namely, they potentially could as the direct purchasers of the
combined up- and downstream anti-competitive arrangement. It therefore needs to
be tacit and should not leave clear evidence.
First of all, however, it needs to be at all possible for the upstream industry to
proﬁtably cartellize when the costs thereof are to reward the downstream ﬁrms each
for their silence by at least the net amount they can obtain by bringing the cartel
to light and ﬁling an antitrust damages suit. That is, the cartellization upstream
needs to create a surplus substantially over and above that from up- and downstream
competition, which can subsequently be divided in the chain. Such extra total proﬁt
is available in an upstream conspiracy to raise prices, provided that the total number
of ﬁrms involved up- and downstream is suﬃciently large. This is made more precise
in the following result.





it is possible for the upstream ﬁrms to increase the sum total of up- and downstream
proﬁts from the competitive proﬁt level by increasing the input price from its compet-
itive level pc.
Proof. From equations (1)a n d( 2) it follows that the consumer price is given by
P (p)= 1
n+1 + n





Thus, for a given p, the total proﬁts of the downstream ﬁr m s( w h i c hr e m a i ni n
Cournot competition) are nπd (p)=n
¡1−p
n+1
¢2. Total proﬁts for the upstream cartel
are mπu (p)=pQd (p)= n
n+1p(1 − p).T o t a l p r o ﬁts in the chain as a function of
p,Πa (p), then are
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n . Trivially, maximum total chain proﬁts are equal
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Yet, Πa (p) ≥ Πc for a price equal to or higher than pc only if p∗ = 1
2
n−1
n ≥ pc = 1
m+1,
which is equivalent to n ≥ m+1
m−1.
The Lemma restricts attention to upstream cartel prices that are not lower than
the input price under competition. For those prices, the necessary scope for a tacit
vertical collusion arrangement exists, as long as the number of ﬁr m si n v o l v e di sl a r g e
enough. Yet, for a small number of ﬁrms, there can be mutual gain in an upstream
cartel as well. In fact, only when either the up- or the downstream market is served
by a duopoly and the other by a triopoly, is there no scope for increased proﬁts–
for then n = m+1
m−1. When the downstream market is served by a monopoly, and
irrespective of the upstream market structure, or when the upstream market is served
by a duopoly–or a monopoly, for that matter, but that possibility has been ruled
out by assumption–and the downstream market by either a monopoly or a duopoly,
the combined industry proﬁts can be increased as well, but with lower input prices
for the downstream industry than under competition. For those market structures,
therefore, the combined proﬁt increase is had by the downstream ﬁrms–and possibly
the consumers–not the upstream ﬁrms. To get the upstream ﬁrms to ever engage
in collusion under these conditions will be hard–and a compensation scheme would
be brought to light right away under our assumption on the legal system. For this
reason, we restrict the analysis to conditions under which the total surplus increase
from upstream collusion is had upstream.
The potential to compensate downstream ﬁrms is one element necessary for sus-
taining an otherwise unstable upstream production cartel with the help of Illinois
Brick.Y e t , Illinois Brick only comes into play to facilitate any such arrangement
when it is not possible to also compensate the consumers with the extra cartel proﬁts.
That is, the vertical agreement must indeed result in consumer detriment. After all,
the operational eﬀect of Illinois Brick that we want to bring to the fore is that, as
a result of the Supreme Court standard, the upstream industry can focus its side-
payments eﬀorts solely on the direct purchasers. Without Illinois Brick, the upstream
collusive arrangement would quickly come under pressure if consumers have an un-
ambiguous incentive to sue for their damages. Only when indeed acting as a shield
against claims that would have been made by others than the direct purchasers, if
only they were given the right to do so, can Illinois Brick have the potential anti-
competitive eﬀects here identiﬁed.
A second brick required for the wall, therefore, is the following result on the
total surplus in this market. It shows that upstream cartellization, while increasing
the combined proﬁts of the producers, indeed decreases consumer welfare more than
proportionally. Hence, total welfare is lower when the upstream industry colludes,
13relative to when it remains in Cournot competition, so that no compensation scheme
exists that can make everyone better oﬀ with upstream collusion.
Lemma 2 Total welfare, deﬁned as total proﬁts plus consumer surplus, decreases
from its level under competition when the upstream cartel input price is increased
from its competitive level pc.
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an increase in the price reduces welfare.
Note that Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 combined reﬁne the well-know result that
vertical integration of up- and downstream monopolies is socially eﬃcient when it
eliminates the double monopoly markup when both the up- and the downstream
industry are a monopoly.12 In our setup, with a variable number of ﬁrms in each
industry, integrating vertically involves horizontal integration as well. In our sim-
ple model of up- and downstream competition, the increased eﬃciency eﬀects from
taking out double marginalization outweigh the consumer detriment eﬀect that the
integration has by eliminating horizontal competition only when very few ﬁrms are
incumbent in the market, so that input and consumer prices fall, and total output
increases. Whenever there are originally more than just very few ﬁrms in the market,
collusive practices in the production chain inevitably beneﬁt ﬁrms only through in-
creases in prices and reductions in output, thus going at the expense of total welfare.
The eﬃciency enhancing eﬀects attributed to vertical integration in the literate are
very speciﬁc, that is, to markets in which there was very little or no competition to
begin with.
12 Cf. Carlton and Perloﬀ (2000), pp.398-401, or Motta (2004), pp.306-46.
145 An Illinois Wall
Everything is in place now for an example of an Illinois Wall. The key to erecting
one is for the upstream cartel to compensate the downstream ﬁrms for their actual
injury plus the amount of treble overcharge they are entitled to irrespective of their
true damages by Hanover Shoe. There are several ways in which the upstream ﬁrms
can indeed pass on some of their cartel proﬁts to compensate their direct purchasers,
ranging from overt money transfers to oﬀering CEO’s all-inclusive jaunts to the Trop-
ics. As said, however, any scheme that can complement Illinois Brick has to satisfy
some constraints. It should, of course, be suﬃciently interesting for the downstream
ﬁrms not to break it–beneﬁtting from it ﬁrst, and then ﬁling suit after all. More
importantly, it should be covert, as any evidence of collusive arrangements explicitly
involving the downstream ﬁrms opens up the possibility for consumers ﬁling for tre-
ble damages, they now being the fully informed direct purchasers of ﬁrms in breach
of the competition laws. Crucially, therefore, it has to be tacit in that all parties
involved understand its value with little or no communication, and certainly no overt
agreements are necessary.
O n ep o s s i b l ec o m p e n s a t i o ns c h e m et h a ts a t i s ﬁes these constraints amounts to
a restriction on the number of inputs the upstream ﬁrms sell to the downstream
ﬁrms. This creates an artiﬁcial scarcity on the downstream market, from which the
downstream ﬁrms proﬁt. Particularly this is so if the cartel distributes the limited
amount of inputs evenly over the downstream ﬁrm, and charges a relatively low price
per unit. When the downstream ﬁrms are ‘put on allocation’ in this way, it has an
eﬀect that is illustrated in the ﬁgure below.
The ﬁgure displays the individual situation of a downstream ﬁrm, which is horizon-
tally in Cournot competition. The upstream cartel supplies the downstream industry
with a restricted quantity of inputs Qu, which it allocates evenly over all n down-
stream ﬁrms, so that each receives 1
nQu only, at an input price per unit of p.G i v e n
its linear production technology–involving no further costs by assumption–and in
the knowledge that all other downstream ﬁr m sh a v eb e e na l l o t t e dt h es a m en u m b e r
of inputs and therefore each produce the same amount of inputs, each downstream
ﬁrm can safely expect to sell its qi,d = 1
nQu units at a consumer market price of P.A t





, so that the individual downstream proﬁts under this rationing scheme
are represented by area Pacp.
Given residual demand, the input price that would have corresponded to this sales
price of P, if it were not for the upstream cartel artiﬁcially rationing the input levels, is
p0,w i t ha na s s o c i a t e dp r o ﬁto fPabp 0. Hence, the quantity-constraint-low-input-price
combination increases the proﬁts of the downstream ﬁrm by an amount represented
by p0bcp.T h i se x t r a p r o ﬁt can be understood as compensation for the downstream
producer awarded by the upstream ﬁrms. If the direct purchasers do understand the













































Figure 1: An individual downstream Cournot competitor ‘put on allocation’.
with power to speak up and unmask the anti-competitive arrangement. No money
passes hands. The deal is tacit and simple. It requires little or no communication
and therefore need not leave any evidence. It can, therefore, easily escape prosecution
under the antitrust laws by consumers or government authorities, as the upstream
ﬁrms can hardly be made to supply more inputs than the downstream ﬁrms are willing
to buy.
As a result, the arrangement allows for a stable Illinois Wall, as follows. The









and because of Illinois Brick, the upstream industry needs to do so only under the
restriction that none of the ﬁrms in the downstream industry has an incentive to
bring a private damages claim. To that end, the upstream industry can play a trigger
strategy in which the upstream cartel rations at a low price, as long as no ﬁrm in
the downstream industry sues. If any one of the downstream ﬁrms decides to claim
treble damages, the upstream cartel breaks down and the upstream industry reverts
to Cournot competition from then on.
Faced with this upstream trigger strategy, the proﬁts of each downstream ﬁrm










i=1 qi,d is total downstream production under the rationing scheme. If
ad o w n s t r e a mﬁrm would bring a private treble damages suit, it would receive the
lucrative proﬁt for the period in which it defects from the tacit arrangement, plus
treble damages in that period. Then the arrangement breaks down and each ﬁrm in
the downstream industry will receive the normal competitive Cournot proﬁts for the
rest of time. Hence, total discounted pay-oﬀ from suing for a downstream ﬁrm is
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in which the damages award is 1
nth of the downstream industry-wide damages Dd (p)
under the symmetric tacit rationing scheme. Notice that if a downstream ﬁrm decides
to sue, it still reaps the beneﬁts of the price discount in the current period. Moreover,
notice that because the downstream ﬁrms are put on allocation at low input prices,
the level of actual damages is relatively low, compared to when full upstream cartel
prices were charged–thus reducing the incentive to notify the arrangement in two
ways.
Rewriting these costs and beneﬁts of ﬁling suit and comparing them, the down-
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This key condition is quite intuitive: for each downstream ﬁrm, the present dis-
counted value of the downstream future payoﬀs under the rationing upstream cartel
regime should be larger than the present damages claim–as said, under the only
modestly raised cartel input prices–plus the discounted value of proﬁts under up-
and downstream Cournot competition.
When condition (6), which depends crucially on whether or not the downstream
ﬁrms weigh future beneﬁts suﬃciently high–as expressed by their discount value δ–
is satisﬁed for each downstream ﬁrm i, they will each prefer the collusive arrangement
over competition amongst their suppliers. When, moreover, the upstream industry
is able to raise proﬁts above the Cournot level amongst them, the Illinois Wall is a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. It was noted before that the latter implies that
the low input price at which the downstream industry is put on allocation should at
least be as high as the input price that would result under upstream competition,
that is, in equilibrium p ≥ pc. Note furthermore that this condition implies that the
remaining potential damages claim for the downstream ﬁr m si sn o n - n e g a t i v e .S i n c e
the upstream cartel determines the extent to which the downstream ﬁrms are put
on rationing, as well as the price of the inputs, it will set the rationing scheme so as
to make each downstream ﬁrm just indiﬀerent between going along with the collu-
sive arrangement and ﬁling for damages. Although this makes the anti-competitive
arrangement particularly attractive for the upstream ﬁrms, the downstream ﬁrms are
17not in a position to demand more of the surplus, for they cannot credibly threaten
to notify the arrangement and sue for their individual damages.
In all, this allows for our main result.
Theorem 1 If δ>δ
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u and none of the downstream ﬁrms has an incentive to exercise its
right to sue for treble antitrust damages.





holds for each ﬁrm i with equality, and p ≥ pc. Multiplying left and right by n,t h e
number of downstream ﬁrms, and substituting Qd = Qu, returns the industry-wide
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Note that obviously (Qc
u,p c) satisﬁes this constraint, for under regular Cournot com-
petition, there would be no damages. Hence, the proﬁt maximizing cartel supply
of inputs-at-low-prices needs to give weakly higher proﬁts to the cartel than under
Cournot competition, for otherwise the cartel would choose to behave honestly com-
petitively.
Solving equation (5) for p gives
p =
1













Substituting this into the proﬁtf u n c t i o nmπa,r



































Given this value of Q
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18As said, we need p∗ ≥ pc. It can easily be shown that this is so for δ close to
unity. Moreover, there is a unique value of δ in [0,1),g i v e nb yδ
∗ deﬁn e di n( 7 )i nt h e
Theorem–which is found by substituting the equilibrium value of nπc
d from equation
(4) and the fact that pc = 1
m+1 into the expression for p∗ above–for which p∗ = pc.
At this value of δ
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which proves that only for δ>δ
∗ the rationing price exceeds the Cournot price pc.
6 Resilience of the Wall
We have thus established that Illinois Walls can exist. To determine whether they
may be a concern, we need to consider their resilience to pressures so far assumed
away, such as entry, information asymmetries, less than perfect legal proceedings,
and the possibility of public cases. Consider entry ﬁrst. Since the upstream cartel
is quite overtly proﬁtable, it is attractive for new ﬁrms to attempt to enter the
upstream market. Likewise, even though the vertical compensation scheme is tacit,
the proﬁts made in the downstream industry are likely to attract entrants as well.
Obviously, neither the upstream, nor the downstream ﬁrms would welcome entry into
their market. Yet, potential entry upstream is no diﬀerent from the classical cartel
entry problem, for which a number of solutions have been oﬀered in the literature.13
Downstream, however, although the pressure of entry may be less strong, new entrants
do form a potential threat that is particular to the Illinois Wall arrangement. When,
for example, the downstream ﬁrms pressure the upstream cartel not to allow the new
entrant in, by refusing to supplying it with inputs, the potential entrant could attempt
to bring a case on grounds of refusal to deal, which–although typically diﬃcult
for new entrants–as a provable infringement of competition law may threaten the
stability of the wall.
Interestingly enough, however, the aid of Illinois Brick to sustain vertical chain
collusion is greater, the more ﬁrms operate in both the up- and the downstream
industry. To see that, ﬁrst note that by Lemma 1 it is necessary that n>m+1
m−1
for potential side-payments to at all exist within the upstream cartel. That is, an
Illinois Wall can only be erected if the level of competition in both the up- and the
downstream industry exceeds that of duopoly. Second, δ
∗ decreases both in m,t h e




13 Cf. Carlton and Perloﬀ (2000), Chapter 5.
19so that when the number of upstream ﬁrms becomes very large, the Illinois Wall
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µ+1 to zero, as m increases from two up until inﬁnity, opening
up the space of possible discount factors for which an Illinois Wall can be erected.
The reason why Illinois Walls are resilient to entry and are, in fact, more stable,
the more competitive the horizontal layers in the production chain is two-fold. Fierce
downstream competition allows the downstream ﬁrms to pass a larger part of their
overcharge on to the consumers. Under Illinois Brick, these passed on damages
escape claiming, for the consumers have no right to recover them. Consequently,
the monetary incentive to sue for private damages is smaller, as a successful claim
will recover the damages money, but has little long term beneﬁts as the true injury
from upstream collusion felt downstream was only small. At the same time, a larger
number of competitors in the upstream industry makes the vertical collusion scheme
more attractive to each of them, compared to competition, so that they can forward
a larger sum in side-payments to the downstream level.
In fact, these results reveal that, although our modelling of up- and downstream
competition as Cournot quantity setting allows for tracing the processes at work, this
typical competitive process is certainly not driving the result. Suppose, namely, that
up- and downstream producers would be in Bertrand competition instead, and there-
fore price at marginal costs. Then, the upstream collusive arrangement would easily
increase proﬁts far over and above the increase established in the present analysis.
Moreover, the downstream industry would, as it remains in Bertrand competition, be
able to pass all of the overcharge on to the consumers, thus increasing proﬁts with
only the smallest amount of side-payments. In this, total welfare certainly is reduced.
Hence, the misuse of Illinois Brick is at least as proﬁtable as it is under Cournot
competition–which checks our ﬁnding that the more competitive the production
chain as a whole, the more scope there is for setting up an Illinois Wall.
Yet, despite the fact that the Illinois Wall conspiracy can cope with entry up-
and downstream, an increase in the number of participants does introduce issues of
stability. For the horizontal stability of the upstream cartel an appeal to traditional
stability arguments–typically building on the folk theorem–remains suﬃcient to
ignore the matter for our main result. Yet, it should be noted that the larger the
number of ﬁrms in the upstream industry, the more strain will be put on the horizon-
tal collusive arrangement. When the number of upstream cartel members increases,
namely, each individual upstream ﬁrm has an increased incentive to defect and un-
dercut the cartel price, up to a point where it is no longer sustainable–although
it is questionable whether the downstream ﬁrms are willing to accept the larger in-
put oﬀer, knowing that it undermines the Illinois Wall. There are, therefore, two
conﬂicting eﬀects of more competition upstream. On the one hand, more upstream
20ﬁrms widens the space of discount factors for which Illinois Walls exist, while on the
other it narrows that for which the upstream industry is able to sustain it amongst
themselves. But then again, the Illinois Wall does make it possible to sustain the up-
stream cartel quite openly, possibly involving regular meetings, written agreements
and explicit enforcement mechanisms. It is only the vertical arrangement that is tacit
and therefore truly fragile.
Entry from participants to the arrangement downstream would make it harder for
each of the individual downstream ﬁrms to understand that the upstream industry is
indeed handing it down concealed proﬁts via the symmetric rationing scheme at low
prices. Apparently, the practice of putting downstream customer on allocation is not
uncommon.14 Cigarette companies in the US used to allocate supplies with a system
in which wholesalers were limited to small increases over previous purchases–unless
they could show that they had acquired new retail customers. Nevertheless, the
tobacco wholesalers sued the manufacturers for price ﬁxing. Clearly the wholesalers
had not understood that the vertically installed symmetric rationing scheme may
well have been to the beneﬁt of all of them. The more downstream ﬁrms are to be
involved in the tacit collusion, the more diﬃcult it would probably become to make
each of them understand the arrangement. The eﬀect that the ‘putting on allocation
at low prices’ reduces the individually known actual damages, on the other hand,
would still apply. Moreover, since δ
∗ in the Theorem is established by making the
incentive constraint for the downstream ﬁrms just bind in equilibrium, it really is an
upper-bound value for which the Illinois Wall exists. Typically, there is surplus cartel
proﬁts over and above the level of side-payments handed down to the downstream
ﬁrms to make them just indiﬀerent between participating in the anti-competitive
arrangement and ﬁling for damages, that the upstream industry could share in case
the downstream ﬁrms need a little more encouragement to remain in the arrangement.
Yet, even though one would expect the downstream ﬁrms to be educated over time
in the repeated game, it seems reasonable to expect Illinois Walls in markets were
the number of competitors is limited.
Next, consider the assumptions made sofar about the availability of public infor-
mation and the related eﬃciency of the legal system. We have shown that Illinois
Walls exist, even when the existence of the upstream cartel is common knowledge
and the legal system is perfect in the handling of private damages cases. As a result,
bringing a private damages claim–provided one has standing to sue–would result
in the awarding of treble damages with certainty and at no legal transaction costs. If
information is less perfect, or if the judicial system involves non-negligible costs, or
if the eventual conclusions of law, even when a case does in fact have merit, ap r i o r i
are uncertain, then the bringing of private cases would only be hindered further. The
14 We are indebted to Franklin Fisher for providing the following example, possibly of an Illinois
Wall that came down and into the open when downstream ﬁrms ﬁled suit nevertheless. Cf. Holiday
Wholesale Grocery Co., et al., v. Philip Morris Incorporated, et al., Civil Action No.1:00-CV-0447-
JOF.
21reason for this is that then the eventually awarded net damages money and thereby
the private incentives to bring cases, would be reduced. This would enhance the
scope for erecting an Illinois Wall. Analytically, it corresponds to a reduction in µ,
which decreases the value of δ
∗–eventually to zero when µ approaches zero–thus
stabilizing the walls. This is particularly so, if, in line with the literature attribut-
ing eﬃciency gains to Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, we assume that information
about the existence of the upstream cartel is asymmetric, with the downstream ﬁrms,
as direct purchasers, having evidence about the arrangement that is superior to that
of the consumers.
The same is not true for the introduction of public antitrust enforcement into the
picture. Where those advocating Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick would typically
consider private enforcement superior over public enforcement, the latter turns out
to be a desirable complement to the former when Illinois Walls are a possibility.
Public cases will, no diﬀerent from private ones, put stress on both the horizontal
and the vertical cartel arrangements, thus potentially undermining them. Although
the incentive for public oﬃcials to bring anti-competitive practices to light may indeed
be smaller than that of private parties themselves aﬀected in their well-being by the
cartel prices, obviously, under our assumptions on the ready availability of information
of law breaching, the upstream cartel would be a sitting duck for the government.
And should government still miss it, the parens patriae provision for consumers and
indirect purchasers to ﬁle a complaint on the anti-competitive behavior of upstream
ﬁrms that are out of their reach by Illinois Brick with their state antitrust enforcers
or the Department of Justice would clearly provide an incentive–albeit without being
rewarded damages money–to notify cases to the authorities, in an attempt to reduce
consumer prices.15 Yet, under reference to the previous observation that imperfect
and asymmetric information would fortify Illinois Walls, we believe that in a world
with less than perfect information the presence of a public enforcement channel is no
guarantee against their presence.
Finally, consider programs designed to increase the private incentive to notify
infringements of competition law, such as leniency programs, which oﬀer protection
from remedies to those ﬁrms involved in anti-competitive arrangements that report
them to the antitrust authorities ﬁrst, and possibly put premiums on notiﬁcation. In
the present setting, this would be the equivalent of the direct purchasers being entitled
to a larger sum of damages money than treble what they have been overcharged.
Analytically, this takes the form of an increase in µ. It is, therefore, worth noting
that from the remedy perspective, the potential to erect Illinois Walls vanishes only
when the impact of the private damages claims is increased to inﬁnity. In most of
the existing literature on incentive eﬀects from private antitrust enforcement, such
as Baker (1988) and Besanko and Spulber (1990), multiple damages are applauded.
15 A related issue arises from the 1981 Supreme Court decision in J. Truett Payne Co., Inc.
v. Chrysler Motors Corp. 451 U.S. 557 (1981) that indirect parties can ask in private cases for
injunctions to break up the upstream cartel in state courts.
22The point of Besanko and Spulber, for example, is that private antitrust enforcement
eﬀectively increases social welfare, yet only for a suﬃciently large damage multiple.
Our result goes in the same direction. In the present analysis, for any ﬁnite damages
multiple–and certainly for the treble damages for which the upper-bound to δ
∗ is
3
4–there remain reasonable discount factors for which Illinois Walls exist.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have identiﬁed a potential anti-competitive eﬀect of the inﬂuential twin Supreme
Court rulings in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, so far largely ignored in the liter-
ature, despite some empirical indication for its existence. Several aspects important
for understanding the full eﬀect of private damages claims have been set aside above
in order to oﬀer an unobstructed view on the strategic role that Illinois Brick can
play in stabilizing chain collusion in our example. As a result, the setup of our model
is simple. Yet, we believe it captures the nature of the anti-competitive eﬀect Illinois
Brick may have. Moreover, we have shown that extensions in a number of directions
that would need to be covered in a more complete treatment of the issues involved
in private antitrust enforcement make our example of an Illinois Wall more resilient.
Also, variations to our analysis such as the introduction of non-linearity in demand,
production technology or cost structures, we expect not to change our qualitative
ﬁndings. And Illinois Walls can surely be erected in longer vertical chains.
Nevertheless, we do acknowledge that we have not dealt more than in passing
with the larger part of the potential for eﬃciency gain attributed to Illinois Brick
in the existing literature. We have abstracted from these potential gains to focus
on contributing just a single new argument to the debate–which is that Illinois
Brick may create eﬃciency losses as well. Obviously, for a full understanding of the
complex incentive issues that play in antitrust enforcement, a fair weighing of all the
arguments is essential. Such a comprehensive analysis, we leave for further research.
Pointing out a theoretical possibility, as we do, raises the question as to whether
there is any indication that Illinois Walls are indeed a real possibility. The easy
answer to this is that by their nature, Illinois Walls escape direct observation. They
are tacit, hidden and silent. Only through speciﬁcally directed antitrust investigations
may they perhaps be found. This is not suﬃcient answer, of course. And there are, in
fact, industries in which a certain amount of dominance amongst producers is seen in
combination with scarcity of products at the retail level, against which little protest is
heard from the retailers, despite a common grumbling, maybe–but no legal action–
amongst consumers. Such seems to be the case with children’s toys in the days before
Christmas, for example, with the latest CD’s of popular artists, or box oﬃce tickets
for feature ﬁlms in their opening week. Likewise, it is rumored that computer chips
are artiﬁcially rationed when new models come out.
All such examples are sketchy, though, and not very convincing perhaps. The
following suspicion of an Illinois Wall may be more compelling though. In Lopatka
23and Page (2003) an argument against a repeal of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick
at the federal level is build on the observation that for the vast majority of cases in
which the indirect purchasers sued, also the direct purchasers sued, particularly in
price-ﬁxing prosecutions. Many of these indirect cases were follow-on actions. From
this, they infer that “experience shows that direct purchasers are not reluctant to
sue,” which to them substantiates their over-all conclusion that Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick rightly put the incentive to bring cases with the party most likely to do
so.16 They discuss, however, one striking exception they found to this rule, which is
the U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. follow-on litigation. Although indirect purchasers have
ﬁled class action suits against Microsoft wherever state law gives them standing to
sue, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) such as Compact, Dell and Gateway
have sofar not sued Microsoft for damages. More importantly, despite the fact that as
direct purchasers, the OEMs are likely to have had superior information on Microsoft’s
anti-competitive practices, they have not been instrumental in the instigation of the
public case either.
Lopatka and Page believe that it is not likely that the OEMs did not bring a
private damages case out of fear of retaliation. Microsoft frequently deals with ﬁrms,
like Apple, they say, that have sued the company. Also, according to them, courts
may require Microsoft to maintain relationships–as Judge Motz did in the Sun Mi-
crosystems litigation. Why then did the OEMs not ﬁle against Microsoft? Well,
possibly the OEMs beneﬁted from Microsoft’s exclusionary practices, as well as the
company’s attempts to maintain its dominant market position, by levying it through
predatory pricing from the OS market to the browser market. In fact, there is clear
indication that Microsoft may well have reduced prices to the OEMs. Lopatka and
Page say that:
“[S]ome OEMs may have received compensation in return for cooperating
in restrictive practices, compensation that would in principle reduce the
amount of damages.” (op.cit., p.39)
Moreover, by restricting the OEMs principle input, Windows OS, to install before
shipping on their computer systems, Microsoft may on top of that have been instru-
mental in restricting the supply of computers on the ﬁnal consumer market, thus
raising the PC price above its competitive level, and maintaining a substantial proﬁt
for the OEMs that was large enough for them to refrain from seeking treble dam-
ages. If this kind of input-rationing-at-low-prices indeed took place, it may well be
an example of an Illinois Wall.17
16 Lopatka and Page (2003), p.37.
17 In Hall and Hall (2000) an upstream-downstream model of Cournot competition among com-
puter manufacturers is developed, in which the OEMs have a derived demand for Windows OS as
the vital input for producing complete PC’s, that allows for studying the beneﬁts for the OEMs of
this type of an Illinois Wall arrangement.
24Yet, all this remains anecdotal evidence. A serious empirical study into the matter
is called for. As discussed in the introduction, however, the empirical approach to the
issue in Landes and Posner (1979) and Snyder (1986), in which the total number of
private damages cases brought over time is checked for structural breaks around the
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick ruling, has remained largely inconclusive. A related
further Supreme Court ruling, however, from 1989 in California v. ARC America
Corp., may provide grounds for a diﬀerent approach.18 ARC America leaves it to the
discretion of the individual states to allow indirect purchaser suits or not. As a result
the practice varies from state to state, with states allowing indirect purchasers to
claim antitrust damages being referred to as ‘Illinois Brick Repealers’.19 To identify
the possible presence of Illinois Walls, one approach could, therefore, be to compare
the number of direct purchaser suits in states that followed Hanover Shoe and Illinois
Brick with those that repealed–which is roughly half of them. Although this seems
to be a promising approach, it is potentially quite troublesome.20 We therefore leave
it for further research.
Finally, we want to point out a possible strategy of industry organization opened
up by Illinois Brick. The analysis above departed from an exogenously given market
structure, in which the upstream cartel engages in a collusive arrangement with the
existing downstream purchasers. Suppose, however, that the vertical production
chain is more simple, in that initially the producers are dealing directly with the
ﬁnal consumers. In such a setting, it may be a proﬁtable strategy for the producers
to establish seemingly independent downstream purchasers through which to trade.
That is, the upstream ﬁrms may engage actively in installing a competitive layer of
downstream ﬁrms to act as a shield against otherwise direct purchaser claims. The
same logic applies in a longer vertical chain. Illinois Walls, therefore, potentially
involve a vertical disintegration with legal corporations, otherwise empty. To expect
ﬁrms to indeed register such fake competitive ‘Bahama’s-ﬁrms’ to act as an Illinois
Wall is a little farfetched perhaps. Surely, however, Illinois Brick may keep ﬁrms
from vertically integrating parts of the production chain, thus blocking the potentially
welfare enhancing eﬀects thereof.
In all, it seems that the possible misuse of the twin Supreme Court positions in
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick to construct Illinois Walls in vertical production
chains merits notiﬁcation, and cannot be as easily discarded of as the early literature
did. Its negative welfare eﬀects need to be taken into consideration and weighted
against the potential eﬃciency gains of Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe that have
so far been forwarded. Despite of its relevance to many prominent antitrust cases
since the late 1970’s, and some indication that Illinois Walls may indeed exist, the
18 Cf. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
19 Cf. Davis (1997) and Page (1999).
20 We are indebted to William Page and Robert Lande for pointing out a number of diﬀerences
in judicial conditions in the various repealer states, that would potentially interfere with ﬁnding
unbiased results in the approach proposed.
25potential defense strategy that Illinois Brick oﬀers upstream ﬁrms to ward oﬀ private
antitrust cases is not yet suﬃciently well understood.
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